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Medical Altruism in Mainstream Health
Economics: Theoretical and Political Paradoxes
Philippe Batifoulier and Nicolas Da Silva
EconomiX, Paris Ouest University, Nanterre, France
Abstract In the field of healthcare, ethical considerations are omnipresent. The
problem is that it is not clear how to introduce professional ethics within the frontiers
demarcated by economic rationality. In mainstream economics, medical altruism is
defined as the inclusion of the patient’s welfare in the doctor’s utility function. This
definition presents two serious problems that we develop in this paper. The first
problem is that mainstream theory does not propose a model of authentic altruism
because it reduces otherness to a source of utility like any other. The second problem
is that ethical and altruistic (instrumental or otherwise) behaviour should not be
conflated. By reducing ethics to altruism, mainstream theory prevents any genuine
discussion of medical ethics. Then, the thesis of the paper is that the attempt to
introduce altruism into the standard framework creates theoretical paradoxes that
create policy dilemmas.
Keywords: healthcare, altruism, professional ethics, instrumental rationality,
intrinsic motivation
JEL Classifications: A13, B41, I10, I18
1. INTRODUCTION
In the field of healthcare, ethical considerations are omnipresent. Every medicine-
related profession has a professional morality, supported by a “code of
deontology” as for example the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical
Ethics that stipulates the ethical attitude to be followed, a “Council of the Order”
to enforce it or, for doctors a “Hippocratic oath” that commits them to an ethical
orientation.1 Values in medical ethics such as beneficence, non-maleficence,
justice and respect for autonomy induce special responsibilities for professionals
q 2014 The Association for Social Economics
1 We have made no distinction between ethics and morality in this paper.
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(Gillon 1994). There is also a strong belief that doctors display ethical
considerations in their daily work (Glannon and Ross 2002).
From this point of view, Arrow (1963), in his seminal article, emphasised the
importance of physicians’ concern for medical ethics:
It is clear from everyday observation that the behavior expected of sellers of medical care
is different from that of business men in general. These expectations are relevant because
medical care belongs to the category of commodities for which the product and the
activity of production are identical. In all such cases, the customer cannot test the product
before consuming it, and there is an element of trust in the relation. But the ethically
understood restrictions on the activities of a physician are much more severe than on those
of, say, a barber. His behavior is supposed to be governed by a concern for the customer’s
welfare which would not be expected of a salesman. In Talcott Parsons’s terms, there is a
“collectivity-orientation”, which distinguishes medicine and other professions from
business, where self-interest on the part of participants is the accepted norm. (949)
Given that it is an essential coordinating factor, medical ethics cannot be excluded
from standard health economics. The problem is that it is not clear how to
introduce professional ethics within the frontiers demarcated by economic
rationality. The proposed solution to this problem is to confine the professional
ethics of doctors to economic calculus in order to explain medical ethics with the
tools of mainstream economic theory. The ethical attitude of a doctor is thus
formalised in terms of “medical altruism”. This concept is intended to take into
account the values of doctors by assuming that the paradigm of homo economicus
is a sufficient starting point (although it may have to be modified). These values
are incorporated through the utility concept. The individual is endowed with
“classic” individual preferences (in the context of the work-leisure trade-off, for
example) to which are added “social” preferences. Drawing on the traditional
definition of altruism in mainstream economics, advocated by Harsanyi (1955)
and Becker (1981), medical altruism is defined as the inclusion of the patient’s
welfare in the doctor’s utility function.
This representation of altruism consists of an internalisation of the patient’s
utility function (or a proxy variable such as income or health state) into that of the
doctor. An altruistic doctor remains a utility maximiser, whose utility function
includes the well-being of the patient. This definition presents two serious
problems that we develop in this paper.
The first problem is that mainstream theory does not propose a model of
authentic altruism because it reduces otherness to a source of utility like any other.
Instead it is an instrumental altruism that does not take into account actions that
are undertaken with the intention of benefiting another individual where is
motivated by a non-instrumental concern for his or her welfare (Joyce 2007). In
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contrast, genuine altruism, which the mainstream never speaks about, is much
closer to our common-sense understanding of the term. The second problem is that
ethical and altruistic (instrumental or otherwise) behaviour should not be
conflated. Indeed, it is very easy to imagine situations where an altruistic action
might be unethical. For example,2 an accomplice to a murder may aid the one who
tortures the victim to death. This can be altruistic—but ethical? Although ethical
judgements are similar to altruism in the sense that they are independent of the
interests of those who make them, they have a further universalisable and
inescapable dimension: there is no opting out of a moral judgement (Joyce 2007).
Even though he may have acted altruistically, the accomplice to a murder would
find it difficult to avoid feeling guilt. By reducing ethics to altruism, mainstream
theory prevents any genuine discussion of medical ethics.
As a consequence, though it can account for the peculiarities of healthcare
recognised by mainstream health economists (e.g., externalities, information
asymmetries, uncertainty, supplier-induced demand), mainstream health econ-
omics cannot take into account the objective nature of health needs (Hodgson
2009, 2013). Health needs tend to be non-voluntary and unevenly distributed.
Many illnesses, injuries or accidents that create health needs are unpredictable and
independent of the choices or responsibilities of those who suffer them. Failure to
meet health needs leads to harm and suffering. So, health needs are close to the
idea of “vital need” (Batifoulier et al. 2013). The recognition of such a universal
need is one of the foundations of medical ethics. This recognition requires that
health workers must protect patients from harm and suffering as a matter of moral
obligation. This objectivity of health need is in stark contrast with the subjectivity
of utilitarian preferences, and it determines a professional ethos with an
inescapable moral dimension.
Section 2 shows how the economic theory of instrumental altruism was
imported into health economics to solve certain theoretical problems raised by the
concept of supplier-induced demand. The incorporation of an other-regarding
argument into the doctor’s utility function is not only an advance in economic
analysis but also vital to the credibility of rational choice theory when it seeks to
account for doctor’s behaviour. Section 3 develops the thesis of the paper—that
the attempt to introduce altruism into the standard framework creates theoretical
paradoxes that create policy dilemmas. Giving moral motivations the same status
as other utilitarian motivations amounts to purging doctors’ ethics of any
reference to values. This makes a theoretical claim that seems to defy logic. To
explain medical ethics with an instrumental conception of altruism leads to
political propositions that can be absurd or counter-intuitive. So, the introduction
2 We owe this illustration to one of our anonymous reviewers.
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of medical ethics into rational choice theory leads to regulatory as well as
theoretical problems.
2. THE “ETHICAL PREFERENCE” OF THE DOCTOR AND
RATIONAL CALCULUS
The concept of induced demand (Evans 1974) is particularly relevant to health
economics. In most treatments, the doctor is both producer and consumer, since he
translates the patient’s illness or injury into medical consumption by prescribing
the treatment. Consequently, the demand is not independent; it reflects the supply
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Therefore, there should be a positive
correlation between density of doctors and medical consumption: a higher number
of doctors, in a given geographical area, should increase health spending rather
than lower it—as would be the case, theoretically, in a perfect market—and the
total fees charged should also be higher. However, this capacity for induction is
moderated by the existence of an ethic that limits the power to create demand.
Here again, the doctor’s social obligations, to which theorists of demand induction
refer almost systematically, are a response to this original power.
This is because the doctor’s utility function UM ¼ UM (YM, WP) includes both
the classic arguments YM (in terms of income, working hours, etc.) and the more
unusual arguments WP, reflecting the doctor’s social preferences and likely
includes ethical arguments in one form or another. The doctor’s utility thus
incorporates the patient’s welfare and explains medical behaviour as regards price
and quantity. Utility measures the satisfaction of preferences, including the
doctor’s “ethical preference”.
The practitioner’s ethical sensibility is identified with an exogenous preference
or taste, the origins of which are not considered relevant: de gustibus non est
disputandum. Like other individuals, doctors are not responsible for the formation
of their preferences. This “ethical preference” that is given a priori can appear in
the utility function in one of two generic forms.
In the first case, emphasis is placed on the doctor’s discretionary power, and
ethics is used to take into account the disutility of exercising such power. Some
induction models operate in this form: WP ¼ I with U 0I , 0 (e.g., Wilensky and
Rossiter 1984; Woodward and Warren-Boulton 1984). The utility of induction (I)
is positive but decreasing and ethics is invoked to justify this decrease. It is
described as a limit to the power of creating demand. For reasons of altruism, the
doctor curbs the exercise of his discretionary power. He refrains from over-
prescribing or over-charging the patient (through either high fees or unnecessary
consultations), because this “maximal medicine” is costly to him on a
psychological level. The doctor is modelled as maximising utility under self-
REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY
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imposed constraints. Here, medical altruism is identified with a preference that
corrects the other preferences of the doctor. It acts as a constraint on self-interest
and subordinates the other arguments of the utility function to respect of this
constraint, which reduces the doctor’s sovereignty of choice.
The second case, which gives positive consideration to the doctor’s wish to act
in the patient’s best interest, is more in line with the mainstream theory of
altruism. Ethics is explicitly taken into account in the utility function (WP ¼ E),
reflecting the fact that the doctor is concerned with the welfare, health or demands
of a representative patient. In this case, the ethical behaviour increases the
doctor’s utility, and they are positively related (U
0
E . 0).
The patient can be presented in different forms, depending on the modeller’s
imagination and what he is seeking to explain. The doctor may be concerned with
the welfare of the ordinary, average patient (e.g., Richardson 1981). He may be
more sensitive towards particular types, such as poorer patients. Models of price
discrimination are then developed in which the doctor’s satisfaction depends on
the income of his patient (Kessel 1958). The segmentation of patients allows the
doctor to charge different prices depending on the patient. This “discriminatory
ethics” conflicts with the injunctions of the deontological code (Ruffin and Leigh
1973). The doctor may be more sensitive to patients who are interesting from a
clinical perspective because he prefers medicine that is more intellectually
attractive or prestigious. Ethics may then be expressed as a function of disease
severity. The ethical cursor thus moves up and down according to diverse
characteristics of the patients.
This conception of ethics is centred on concern for others. It is applied to the
case of the doctor, but it is not exclusive to doctors. Beneficence and altruism are
generic behaviours that can be found in any individual; they are not peculiar to
doctors (Davis and McMaster 2007). Medical altruism bears a “family
resemblance” to various concepts developed in very different contexts. The
literature proposes other terms instead of altruism to describe the medical
behaviour. Doctor’s “concern” with their patient is similar to that found within a
family, for collective goods or in certain configurations of industrial economics.
Whatever the words used and the form of the formalisation of professional
ethics as altruism the aim is to reject the idea of the full exercise of discretionary
power. Assuming that this power is not constrained leads to an absurd result
whereby the doctor is simply an economic agent like any other.3 At the other
extreme, a “maximal ethic” denies the existence of maximising behaviour. In the
former case, traditional microeconomics is sufficient to explain medical
3 De Jaegher and Jegers (2000), for example, following other papers, show the absurdity of a “no limit” strategy from
a microeconomic point of view.
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behaviour, and there is no need for the specificities of health economics. In the
latter case, there is no need for microeconomics at all.
Taking into consideration ethics is therefore indispensable to formalisation. It
is even exploited in this sense because it allows one to perform the traditional
economic calculus—in a domain that was not a priori receptive to such calculus—
without transforming the doctor into a businessman. The “ethical argument” is
more tractable, friendlier and ultimately more orthodox than a hypothesis of target
income,4 for example, which argues that maximising rationality should be
abandoned in favour of Simonian rationality. Consequently, analysis of the
doctor’s economic rationality almost systematically includes consideration of an
ethic that does not (always) call for comment. It is part of the modeller’s toolbox.
In that sense, this microeconomics of health is also inevitably a microeconomics
of ethics. Ethics formalised in this way is therefore far from anomalous. However,
this need for ethics raises certain problems.
3. INSTRUMENTAL MEDICAL ALTRUISM: PARADOXES OF
ECONOMIC THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC POLICY
This conception of ethics, which reduces ethics to altruism and reduces altruism to
instrumental altruism, has implications for the understanding of medical
behaviour. We can identify several levels of problems raised by medical altruism
of this sort.
The first series of difficulties is theoretical: by reducing ethics to altruism and
altruism to instrumental altruism, the mainstream theory of medical altruism leads
to a series of theoretical paradoxes. Altruism effectively becomes egocentric and
genuine ethical problems are barely touched upon. The second series of problems
lies in the domain of economic policy. In this case, the criticism is shifted onto a
central regulator seeking to regulate an “altruistic” doctor. Such regulation is
difficult because the doctor’s “altruism” is never pure. Indeed, the formalisations
of medical behaviour seek to exclude the totally “altruistic” or totally selfish
doctor. The central regulator must therefore deal with an individual whose
behaviour is located “somewhere” between the extremes of altruism and
selfishness.
In our view, each of the paradoxes of economic theory is closely linked to
economic policy problems. Table 1 summarises our critical perspective. Each
paradox of economic theory leads to an economic policy problem. In Section 3.1,
4 This hypothesis is used notably by Evans as a factor explaining the limits of induction. See also Sweeney (1982) or
Rizzo and Zeckhausser (2003).
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we describe, one by one, each of these paradoxes and the corresponding policy
problem.
3.1 Medical Egocentric Altruism
The first criticism in relation to medical altruism is one that targets mainstream
economic theory of altruism in general. The professional ethic, incorporated into a
utility function, has no moral dimension. It is simply an instrument used to achieve
a given end: not to treat the doctor as an unrestrained maximiser.
The arguments of the utility function, which lend themselves to the same type
of calculus, are then interchangeable as regards their consequences in terms of the
doctor’s satisfaction. The strength of this modelling of medical altruism is that it
reduces the advantages and disadvantages of respecting a norm like medical ethics
to one unique homogeneous measure—utility—by incorporating values into a
cost–benefit analysis. This strength is also a weakness, because it amounts to
defining the ethic by default and dissolving the moral judgement in the calculus
(Ben-Her and Putterman 1998; Folbre and Goodin 2004; Hausman and
McPherson 1993). The analysis makes all the arguments of the utility function
commensurate, and it is always possible to make a trade-off between the different
arguments. However, using the same currency to count preferences of different
orders can lead to paradoxical results. Thus, in the individual component of the
utility function, the doctor’s effort is counted negatively (disutility of effort), but
in the social component, it becomes positive because the doctor is concerned
about the patient’s welfare, devoting time and energy to it. The private effort that
Table 1: From Theoretical Paradoxes to Economic Policy Problems
Economic Theory Paradoxes
Economic Policy Problem Faced by the
Regulator
Medical egocentric altruism Sign a “blank check” to the doctor
Sadistic medical altruism Protect the patient from the doctor
Masochist medical altruism Protect the doctor from the patient
Selfishness premium Less financial reward for an altruistic
doctor than an egoist one
Ambiguous altruism/profit relationship Medical crowding-out effect
MEDICAL ALTRUISM IN MAINSTREAM HEALTH ECONOMICS
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generates a disutility and the social effort underlying recognition of the patient are
not at the same level.5
Unlike “altercentric” altruism (Khalil 2004), this medical altruism is
egocentric because it is “good” from a personal point of view and not
intrinsically. The doctor maximises his welfare by seeking the patient’s welfare.
The moral virtues are only generated from self-interest. Sympathy for the other is
judged on the basis of the benefits it generates. The agents always start by
maximising their own utility, not the utility of others. Good remains irreducibly
attached to subjective welfare. One possible response is to refuse the label
“altruism” to describe this conception (Rose-Ackerman 1996; Sen 1987) and to
transcend the context of interdependence between utilities. Truly altruistic
commitment leads one to prefer an action that might reduce one’s utility, while
another possible action could increase that utility.
This egocentric altruism leads to paternalistic altruism when the doctor takes
responsibility for the patient’s health because he is concerned for his welfare. In
line with Beckerian tradition, the doctor is seen as a benevolent dictator who
knows what is good for the patient (like the “good father”). Each party gains from
the situation, because the “happiness” of the doctor is achieved through the
“happiness” of the patient. In return, the doctor obtains a return on his ethical
investment if the patient behaves like a “rotten kid”: he will remain cooperative
and loyal to the doctor.
Medical paternalism is an accepted doctrine of the medical profession, which
stresses the inequalities of position between the patient and the doctor. The patient
must put himself in the hands of the knowledgeable person, whose judgement is
not clouded by suffering. The right to intervene ensues naturally from the
inequality of position. Thus, paternalism is justified by the lucidity and rationality
of the doctor treating a patient whose safety requires submission. So, the medical
profession does indeed have power, but this power is voluntarily channelled by the
sense of responsibility developed in doctors who seek the welfare of their patients.
The conclusions for economic policy are immediate: giving credit to the idea of
professional ethics within this paternalist context amounts to giving a “blank
cheque” to doctors, who are the only ones capable of knowing what is good for the
health of the patient and naturally oriented towards beneficence. It is then
necessary to provide the tools to reinforce the freedom and autonomy of the
doctor. If it is part of the doctor’s calling to adopt the principle of “the patient
comes first”, then economic policy, the aim of which is to defend the patient’s
5 One way to resolve these paradoxes leads one to adopt another approach to preferences (meta-preferences or
reflexivity of preferences), which departs from the axiomatic of rational choice.
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interests in the name of the common good that is health, need only step aside and
let professional self-regulation do the job.
This conception ensures coordination between patient and doctor simply
through the interplay of individual preferences. The altruistic doctor ratifies the
preferences of the patient without making a moral judgement. Yet, in this
framework, the patient’s preferences can only be wants rather than needs. This
subjectivity makes preferences more fragile and renders medical paternalism
suspect in the eyes of society. In this way, the altruistic doctor can be seen to
satisfy the wants of patient at the expense of violating the code of medical ethics.
The extreme example of euthanasia is worth considering in this context: a doctor
can help a patient die for altruistic reasons, but in what sense is this decision an
ethical one? Lacking basic ethical competence, the doctor cannot distinguish
between acts of ethical altruism and acts of egotistical altruism. It is because
patients express objective, universal needs with a powerful moral dimension that
society is duty-bound to satisfy them and delegates this job to doctors. The
otherness of the medical profession is thus not simply a function of patients’
utilities: it is connected to a universal moral dimension. Medical power is linked to
this obligation to act, which is absent from mainstream theorising.
3.2 Sadistic Medical Altruism
At different levels of analysis, both the medical approach and its economic
formalisation relate medical altruism to the need to take the patient into account.
However, there is nothing to ensure that the doctor will be naturally beneficent, so
modelling altruism in terms of the interdependence of utility functions is
insufficient to guarantee this beneficence (Ballet and Bazin 2006).
The presence of the patient in the doctor’s utility function is no more than an
extension of individual rationality to the presence of the other. The act of looking
after someone is like an externality (a “caring externality”) that can be positive or
negative. There is no need to bring into play a social norm when a partial
identification with the other’s welfare is sufficient. This altruism is a priori neutral
and only produces an economic utility where the action is judged in terms of the
gains it generates for the doer. If we simplify the doctor’s utility function
UM ¼ UM (YM, WP), then the egoist is someone who is insensible to the other:
›UM/›WP ¼ 0. In the case of the altruist, the reverse is true: ›UM/›WP – 0. Envy,
jealousy and malevolence are then forms of this altruism (›UM/›WP , 0)
producing negative utilities. An additional step is then needed to postulate a
beneficent doctor (›UM/›WP . 0). In this case, the doctor gains from caring about
the patient.
MEDICAL ALTRUISM IN MAINSTREAM HEALTH ECONOMICS
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However, when the utility function is formalised in this way, this care for the
other conveys a very particular conception of “otherness”. It can suggest the
existence of sadistic medical behaviour: in the same way as he can obtain utility
by acting in the interest of the patient, the doctor can have an interest in the
suffering of the patient who consults him and seeks his beneficence (McMaster
2007). This beneficent doctor gains from investing in the therapeutic process. He
therefore needs the existence of the disease in order to extract benefit from his
interaction with the patient. The patient’s disease serves the commercial interest
of the doctor.
It is through the suffering of the patient that the doctor is concerned with the
interests of his patient. Here, the suffering is the driving force behind egocentric
action. This strips the medical relationship of all conventional meaning. A doctor
who profits from the suffering of his patient is hardly friendly. He awakens the
suspicion of the patient, who has no interest in trusting him. Medical confidence is
impossible, and the therapeutic relationship is non-existent. This type of
configuration, intensifying the logic of instrumental and selfish interest, leads to
prisoner’s dilemma-type situations where any cooperation is rationally
impossible, even if it is reasonable.
In these conditions, what kind of actions can be taken by the central regulator?
The patient needs the doctor to improve his health status, but the doctor has an
interest in patient suffering. It can be counterproductive to send a patient to
consult his doctor. The regulator has to protect the patient—who needs
healthcare—from the doctor who provides care.
This paradox is linked to the mainstream’s inability to recognise the specificity
of healthcare. Caring about the needs of another member of one’s community is a
universal moral characteristic (Joyce 2007). This is even more the case in
healthcare where health problems are involuntary. From this perspective, avoiding
patients’ suffering constitutes a moral justification for action among doctors. This
goes beyond (instrumental or conventional) altruism in the sense that the doctor
sees himself as bound by obligation to satisfy the needs of the patient and would
not manipulate human suffering for personal gain due to an overpowering sense of
guilt (Joyce 2007). This moral sense is part of healthcare needs because of their
objective dimension and their necessity based on the claims of an individual to
avoid suffering (Batifoulier et al. 2013).
3.3 Masochist Medical Altruism
The analysis of medical altruism is also vulnerable to “egocentric bias”,
investigated in the psycho-economic literature, which describes the tendency of
individuals to believe that others would do the same thing in their place (Levy-
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Garboua et al. 2006). Thus, on the basis of his own position, a beneficent doctor
might infer the beneficence of his patient. This projection can be dangerous. In the
formalisation of altruism in the form of the doctor’s preference, nothing is known
about the patient. The way the patient reacts to the ethical commitment of the
doctor is assumed to be positive. And yet there is nothing to prevent him from
taking advantage of the doctor’s naı¨vete´. The altruism of one can even stimulate
the opportunism of the other. This paradox of unilateral altruism has been
developed from an extension of Becker’s “rotten kid theorem” (Bruce and
Waldman 1990). If the patient is not assumed to have the same ethical “values” as
the doctor, he may behave as a “bad rotten kid” and the “return on ethical
investment” expected by the doctor will not exist. We then find ourselves in a
“Samaritan’s dilemma”6 where the doctor gains from being altruistic while
knowing that the patient will exploit the situation. Altruism by a practitioner will
not lead the selfish patient to act efficiently from the doctor viewpoint (Marciano
2005). Patients do not have an obligation to collaborate with their doctors to
ensure a timely and accurate diagnosis by providing honest answers to the doctors’
queries, and to comply with treatment after a diagnosis has been made.
The doctor concerned about the patient’s welfare is then a naı¨ve doctor and his
beneficence can be counter-productive.7 It is just as if a frustrated maximiser was
considerably weakened by a pure maximiser. Under these conditions, the central
regulator must protect the doctor from his unconditional altruism. This latter can
be costly and counter-productive because it may activate moral hazard-type
behaviour in the patient, which is a source of increased expenditure. The
supervisory authority may then be led to tax this excessive altruism. The doctor
himself cannot react to an opportunistic patient because his hands are tied by his
altruism. He must delegate the sanctions to a third party (the supervisory
authority) who will oblige the patient to be altruistic in return. This situation
where medical altruism becomes a problem for the regulator can be ascribed to a
failure in confidence and reciprocity. The formalisation of values in terms of
interdependent utility functions can make medical beneficence perverse.
Behavioural economics has shown that all cooperation is impossible if the
hypothesis of self-interest is believed to operate widely (Camerer et al. 2011; Fehr
and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis et al. 2003; Kahneman 2011). Patient–doctor
interactions are no exception to this rule. The conception of a cold, cynical patient
who exploits medical altruism is equivalent to the conception of an individual as a
hedonistic pleasure machine (Hodgson 2013). It ignores completely the fear and
anguish associated with illness. Indeed, emotions constitute an important
6 Which is an extension of the prisoner’s dilemma.
7 See for example Liu and Ma (2013).
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mechanism for regulating individual moral conduct (Joyce 2007). Although he
was ignored, Arrow (1963) initially pointed out that it is not because patients can
behave as profit maximisers that they actually do so, especially when social norms
of trust and moral judgements exist.
3.4 Selfishness Premium and Altruism Punishment
In formalising the doctor’s behaviour, the great majority of this literature takes
into consideration the existence of altruism. As we have already said, this is only
justified by the desire not to model the doctor as a simple businessman. From
induced demand to agency theory, medical altruism is a required reference,
because it would appear careless or even counterproductive to ignore the issue.
Altruism moderates discretionary power, without offsetting it completely. Just
as it contradicted the existence of an induction effect, total altruism negates the
utility of financial incentives. The economist would have no need to construct
extrinsic incentives to honesty if the existence of intrinsic motivations already
played that role. The easy answer would be to reject ethics or to consider it as a
troublesome constraint. A purely opportunistic doctor is totally sensitive to
financial incentives. But what to do with a doctor concerned with respecting a
professional ethics?
One approach consists in modulating the financial incentives according to the
characteristics of the doctor. A doctor who is uniquely sensitive to his own private
interest is easier to direct towards the choices of the public authorities. He simply
needs to be compensated for the disutility of his effort. But if the doctor is
altruistic, even to a limited extent, this policy can be difficult to implement
because the moral hazard to be countered is no longer certain, only possible. One
must therefore distinguish between doctors according to their altruism degree
(Bardey and Lesur 2006). A doctor concerned with his patients’ health conditions
produces “good quality” without any incentive. However, the supervisory
authority does not know whether the doctor is honest or not. The financial
incentives must therefore start by revealing the type of doctor (Jack 2005), for
example by directing altruists to public sector—with weak financial incentives—
and opportunists to the private sector—with strong financial incentives (Ma 2007).
A doctor who is already altruistic will need less incentive than a totally selfish
one. From this point of view, the altruist is penalised because he will receive less
financial compensation from the supervisory authority. Conversely, the incentive
is a selfishness premium for the selfish doctor. In this case, what is the interest in
being altruistic, especially if altruism is no more than an instrument at the service
of self-interest?
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This paradox of economic theory leads to a difficult problem of public policy
related to fairness. As shown with some regularity by the work of George Akerlof,
if the amount of payment is an important element to explain work effort, social
norms (Akerlof 1982), fairness (Akerlof and Yellen 1990) and social identity
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000) are also central. In this framework, if there are
significant wage differences between relatively homogeneous individuals, the
lowest paid may react by reducing their effort.
Treating two professional categories differently poses a problem for
conceptions of fairness and presupposes the existence of a moral intuition.
Thus, it is possible that altruistic doctors react badly to significant compensation
differences, and so much more if these differences are made by selfishness
premiums. This problem is particularly relevant in the French healthcare system
where certain doctors impose free market prices while others doctors cannot
(Batifoulier et al. 2011; Delattre and Dormont 2003). Two classes of doctor are
then created with different levels of remuneration. This situation, initially
considered unproblematic, is now a major issue because lower paid doctors seek
to reduce compensation differences considered illegitimate and unfair.
3.5 Ambiguous Altruism/Profit Relationship
If medical altruism appears today a common hypothesis to explain medical
behaviour, it is only recently that the question of the relationship between altruism
and profit has become a challenge to health economists. The question is, to what
extent utility from monetary profit is consistent with the utility from altruism? Is
there complementarity or substitutability between these two sources of utility?
This problem has led to an extensive literature in economics on the study of
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Frey 1997). According to this view, individuals
are extrinsically motivated when the action is performed in the context of
receiving a reward or avoid a punishment. The action is instrumental. Individuals
may also be subject to intrinsic motivation. In this case, the action has no purpose
other than itself. The individual acts for the pleasure inherent to the action.
Consider an example. It is possible to read with passion Martin Eden, one of
the best books by Jack London. And, it is also possible to read this book, not for
pleasure, but to prepare an exam. In the first case, the action is intrinsically
motivated, and in the second case, it is extrinsically motivated.
Economists do not say anything more than this. A doctor can reduce utility
directly by his work (if he is altruist for example) and/or indirectly by the income
associated with this work. The main interest of this theory comes from the
assumption of a crowding-out effect. Under certain conditions, the introduction of
extrinsic motivation while the action was previously intrinsically motivated may
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reduce the latter. Indeed, incentives (extrinsic motivation) may challenge the need
for autonomy or the need for recognition, as the basis of intrinsic motivation.
Insofar as the assumption of medical altruism is credible, this crowding out
effect seems particularly relevant. In fact, if we consider that medical altruism is a
possible form of intrinsic motivation, the problem of the relationship between the
different registers of motivation becomes central. Paradoxically, paying doctors
can dissuade them. This reinforces the difficulties linked to the regulation of
altruists (Mannion and Davies 2008; Marshall and Harrison 2005).
This motivation theory has been retranslated into the language of mainstream
economics, i.e., as an asymmetric information problem (see Rebitzer and Taylor
2011 for a review). Heterogeneous doctors in their level of altruism can be
sensitive about their image: they want to appear virtuous rather greedy (Siciliani
2009). So, an extrinsic reward may lead to a crowding out effect, depending on the
average degree of doctor altruism.
This reformulation of motivation theory is problematic (Ballet et al. 2005).
Beyond the issue already raised of the selfishness premium, there is a problem in
inserting the concept of intrinsic motivation into the utility function. Intrinsic
motivation is defined as a motivation triggered by inherent pleasure in performing
a task. But, it is impossible to translate this kind of motivation into the utility
function’s language. Intrinsic motivation is an anti-utilitarian motivation.
Therefore, there is a paradox in considering altruism as an intrinsic motivation
once it does serve utility.
This new paradox of economic theory leads to a new problem for economic
policy. How is one to reward an altruistic doctor if he could be the subject of a
crowding out effect? This question assumes a major importance when we analyse
the unsatisfactory results of pay-for-performance policies implemented in many
countries (USA, England, France, Australia, etc.). Pay-for-performance is based
on the idea that it is possible to change doctors’ behaviour by indexing their
compensation by numerical indicators of productivity. This position assumes that
doctors are not intrinsically motivated in their job and that monetary incentives are
a relevant and sufficient source of motivation (Wynia 2009). It is the hypothesis of
complementarity of motivation, which is implicitly assumed. But, given the
empirical data, this hypothesis seems hardly debatable. In fact, although the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Obamacare) extends pay-for-
performance mechanism to Medicare programmes, this kind of incentives struggle
to demonstrate their effectiveness (Eijkennar et al. 2013).
Once again, by reducing ethics to altruism, mainstream theory does not allow
one to see the role of ethical judgements in doctors’ behaviour. It is only once we
start with this moral dimension that we can understand the relationships between
different types of motivation:
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The incentives involved in the institutional design of healthcare systems are never entirely
pecuniary. Indeed, the nature of healthcare needs inspire a professional ethos of care and
obligation that is above and beyond any pecuniary motive for healthcare workers.
Healthcare institutions must nurture and harness this ethos of obligation. While pecuniary
incentives are also important, they can be undermined by systems that overshadow and
may serve to override ethical and other commitments through excessive emphasis on
pecuniary rewards. (Hodgson 2013: 192–193).
4. CONCLUSION
What conclusions can be drawn from the introduction of the medical altruism
hypothesis into mainstream theory?What does the assumption of medical altruism
provide that the traditional assumption of profit maximisation does not?
According to Milton Friedman’s methodological instrumentalism, economic
theories should not be judged on the realism of assumptions but on their ability to
predict behaviour. In this framework, profit maximisation hypothesis is not
surprising. But, health economists quickly demonstrate the inability of this
hypothesis to explain doctors’ behaviour. The “no limit” strategy seems to be
absurd. This is why the introduction of medical ethics—in the language of
altruism—is essential. Introducing a more realistic hypothesis may “save” the
theory. In this paper, we aim to assess the medical altruism hypothesis. In our
opinion, by switching the hypothesis of profit maximisation to medical altruism,
health economists lose the theoretical consistency in the interest of realism, but
without producing effective policy recommendations.
In fact, the history of economic thought tells us that a doctor directed by
individual profit is now considered as an unrealistic hypothesis. But this position
has the advantage of avoiding paradoxes of economic theory. If doctors are only
concerned by profit maximisation, they should be financially incentivised
(motivated). Although there is no theoretical problem, the policy recommen-
dations are generally ineffective or partially effective at best. The resounding
failure of pay-for-performance in the USA (for example) or the inability to master
the deficits is witness to this failure.
The interest in the concept of medical altruism is to save or improve economic
theory with a more realistic assumption. However, though the assumption is more
realistic, it induces paradoxes of economic theory. The problem for economists is
that this theoretical inconsistency leads to further unresolved economic policy
issues.
We think the issues of economic theory paradoxes and those of public policies
problems are closely related because the meaning and form of the question raised
by the theory guides the direction of the proposed responses to the public power.
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Therefore, one of our conclusions is that solving these problems of public policy
requires leaving the mainstream framework. Altruism is not reducible to
instrumental altruism and ethics is not reducible to altruism of any sort.
Then, it becomes crucial to consider seriously medical altruism and medical
ethics. Utilitarian calculus prohibits consideration of professional ethics’
normative character. By placing ethical motivations and personal motivations
on the same level, it is impossible to consider the ethic as a social norm where the
doctor can give “something for nothing” without expecting anything return. And
yet, as Elster showed (1998),8 if social norms were counted like economic
utilities, they would have no effect. With most norms, the desired effect is
obtained by seeking another objective. When applied to doctor’s behaviour, this
reasoning brings out the fact that it is, paradoxically, only by showing his
insensibility to the patient’s gratitude or social approval, and more generally by
adopting ethical behaviour in a disinterested manner, that the doctor will meet
with social approval or reciprocal commitment from his patient. In developing a
professional ethics, the doctor expects a return from the patient. There is therefore
no free ethic. But the quality of this ethic resides in the fact that it requires no
return. It can only require payment on condition that it has not been practiced to
that end, as the sociology of the gift suggest (Godbout et al. 2000) or the heterodox
health economic conceptualisation of care shows (Davis and McMaster 2013;
Hodgson 2008).
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